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The Terms of Reference of the Problem 
The question why certain governments are stable and others are un-
stable has long been an object of political analysis. Aristotle discus-
sed governmental stability at some length in Book Two of his Politics1 
and much of Machiavelli's advice, if taken literally, was directed 
2 
towards the maintenance of governments. There are many other examples 
of thi s problem in ancient, medieval and modern political thought. 
As political science evolved into a twentieth century academic 
di scipline, the study of functional problems, governmental stability for 
example, was partially obscured by the dominance of formalized struc-
3 
t ural study. Recently, however, there have been several works which 
have made significant contributions of both a methodological and of a 
1Aristotle, Politics, tr. F. Jowett (New York, 1942) pp. 270-286 . 
2Ni ccolo Machavelli, The Prince, tr. Luigi Ricco (New York, 1940). 
3one statement of this criticism: Gabriel Almond, Taylor Cole, 
and Roy Macr i di s, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European 
Government and Po li t ics," American Political Science Review, XLIX 
(1955), pp. 1042-1049. 
1 
2 
substantive nature to the study of governmental stabilit,y. 4 In general, 
these recent studies have dealt with the broad question of political 
development and have concentrated on the new states, but their scope 
can be narrowed to help the student focus on stability, and their 
findings can be useful in a study of the older states. 
The Problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare the conditions of in-
stability of the parliamentary-cabinet system of the Fourth French 
Republic5 (1946-1958) with the conditions of stability that have charac-
terized the Fifth Republic (1958-1968). After the two regimes have 
been compared according to their relative degree of stability, the 
variables which explain instability and stability will be analyzed. 
The most connnon explanation of governmental instability in France 
stems from the nature of the individuals who make up the French nation. 
4The most promine.nt examples: Seymour Lip set, Political Man 
(Garden Gity, 1960); Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, . The 
Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, 
11 Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political 
Science Review, LV (1961), pp. 493-514; Gabrie~l Almond and Sidney 
Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963); Edward A. Shils, Political 
Develop~t in the New States (s 1Gravenhage, 1962); David Apter, 
Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, 
"Political Development and Political Decay, 11 World Politics, XXII 
(1965), pp. 386-430; Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political 
Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Lucian Pye, 
Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966); Gabrie 1 Almond and 
G. Bingham Powell, Compara:t:ive Pblitics :(Boston, 1966);• · 
5 See: Lowell G. Noonan, "Politics and Government of France," 
European Politics and Government, Clifford Rich, et al. (New York, 
1962), p. 113; Nicholas Wahl, 11 The French Political System," Patterns 
of Government, Samuel Beer, et al. (New York, 1965), pp. 282-300; 
Herman Finer, Governments of Greater European Powers (New York, 1956), 
pp. 271-297; D. W. Brogan and Douglas Vernay, Political Patterns in 
Today's World (New York, 1963), pp. 220-223. 
3 
The hypothesis has generally been advanced that the French are highly 
individualistic and unwilling to compromise. This is thought to be the 
result of an abnormally high .degree of social, economic and cultural 
fract:ionalization that has resulted in a large number of ideologically 
inclined political.groups. This, ;i.n turn, has resulted in a complex 
mu'lti.:.party system with subsequent instability in _the Parliament and 
Cabinet. 
The relative stability during. the Fifth Republic has frequently 
been attributed to the personal charisma of Charles de Gaulle. 6 If 
this proves to be the case, the possibility for prolonged stability 
would seem slight. However, this does. not seem .to be an adequate 
explanation, and one must search for m~re' substantive explanations. 
7 
Several political scientists have suggested that stability in the 
Fifth Republic is the result ·Of the constitutional changes that have 
been made. They contend that the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
provides for a political structure of much greater stability than did 
the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. Attention is usually focused 
on the changes made in the area of executive powers, although modifica-
tions of the legislative process and the electoral system are also 
pertinant influences •. These changes, and their impact on stability, 
wi 11 be investigated and evaluated. 
Another possible explanation for the increased stability during 
the Fifth Republic might be the increase in economic production and 
6 . · .. 
. For examples see: Alexander Werth, De Gaulle (New York, 1965); 
Alan Hatch, The De Gaulle Nobody Knows (NewYork, 1960). 
7A good example is Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, The 
De Gaulle Republic (Homewood, 1960). 
the increase of consumption. The influence of a rising level of af-
fluence will be investigated to see whether it might be related to 
governmental stability. 
Still another possible explanation for the increased level of 
stability of the FUth Republic might be the increased J;'ate of social 
mobility in French society; this variable also will be examined. 
After the investigation is completed, the findings will be evalu-
ated to provide an explanation for the greater stability found in the 
present regime. Perhaps this will be of some value in predicting the 
future pattern of governmental stability in France. 
The Hypotheses 
The. first hypothesis is that the individuals and groups that make 
up the French political system8 adhere to basic patterns of be liefs 
,.• -·, ·. '.· .. 
which are likely to result i,n g.ovetnmentaF instablli.ty. 
The second hypothesis is that the varying degrees of governmental 
stability in the Fourth: and Fifth Republics can be partially explained 
by changes incorpo~ated in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
The third hypothesis is that the. greater degree of governmental 
stability in the Fifth Republic i'sdirectly related to an increase in 
economic production arid consumption levels. 
. - . . . 
The fourth hypothe~is is that the greater degree of governmental 
stability in the Fifth Republic is directly related to an increase in 
social mobility.· 
8 For a discussion of the term "system" see David Easton, The 
Political System (New York, 1964), pp. 96-100. 
4 
5 
Methodology and Organization 
Chapter ll, 11 The Political Base," discusses the first hypothesis. 
This chapter is a study of, French political culture, 9 and examines the 
impact of that culture on governmental stability. The methodology 
used might be called descriptive-analytical and the chapter rests quite 
heavily on previous studies. Cha1>ter'll also contains a discussion of 
the political stresses (war, for example) during the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics. 
Chapter Ill is devoted to the second hypothesis, which focuses on 
the constitutional structures of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. The 
changes in election laws, the executive powers, and the legislative 
process are among the areas of discussion. The impact of these changes 
on the relative degree of governmental :stability is evaluated. 
Chapter IV takes up the third hypothesis which is concerned with 
the relationship between economic production and consumption levels and 
the degree of governmental stability. Economic production is measured 
by per capita gross national product and vari-ation in per. capita. gross 
national product. This variable is measured in each of the two periods 
and related to the degree of govermnental stability. The levels of con-
sumption are measured by comparing per capita gross national product to 
real wages and percentage variations in per capita gross national pro-
duct to percentage variations in real wages. The level of :consumption 
in each of the two periods is then related to the degree of government-
al stability. 
9 . 
For a dis.cussion of the term "political culture" see Chapter II. 
6 
Chapter Vis devoted to the fourth hypothesis, which examines the 
relationship between social mobility and the degree of governmental 
stability in each of the two periods. Social mobility is measured in 
terms of the percentage attending secondary school and college, and 
similar variables. 
The methodology used in Chapters III, IV, and Vis functional-
analytical. 
Chapter VI is a synthesis of the variables discussed in the body 
of the thesis, and evaluates the relative significance of each of the 
hypotheses, their interre fat ions hip and the:· implications· of the find-
ings on the future stability of the Fifth Republic. 
Governmental Stability 
Terminology 
As explained earlier in this chapter, the degree of governmental 
stability during the Fourth and Fifth Republics is the central topic of 
this paper. The obvious first step is an explanation of the term 
"governmental stability." Most political writers who have discussed 
stability have used the term in a broad, general way which totally en-
compasses the system. A good example of this usage is found in 
10 
Lipset's Political Man and a brief discussion of the shortcomings of 
that usage is found in Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture. 
11 
Governmental stability in this paper refers to the personnel com-
position of national political institutions over time periods, i.e., the 
lOLipset, pp. 45-76. 
llThese weaknesses are discussed by Almond and Verba, pp. 10-11. 
7 
length of time during which the personnel remain constant. The 
institutions with which this paper works are the Premiership, the Cabi-
net, and the National Assembly. It is quite obvious that this concept 
of governmental stability is far short of a general stability theory. 
However, it is on this basis that political scientists have criticized 
the Fourth Republic, and it seems valid to assume that this criticism 
is of considerable importance. It must be pointed out that this thesis 
is not designed to be a general theory of stability or stable govern-
ment. It is simply a _discussion of the variables which relate to the 
frequent personnel changes in French government ("governmental insta-
bility"). 
Fourth R.epub lie. 
During the .Fourth Repub:li.c (1946 ... 1958) there" :were 2.1, Premie.rs in 
France (Table I, page 9 ) • During the same period there was a great 
deal of Cabinet instability, as is shown in Table II, page 10 (Cabinet 
composition by party at the beginning of each year durin$ the period). 
The degree of Cabinet fluctuation is shown in Table VI, page 14 and 
one can see that there were an average of 14.0 Cabinet shifts each year 
during the Fourth Republic. Table III, page 11 shows the National 
Assembly composition by party and the same pattern of instability 
exists. There were an average of 158.2 changes in party composition 
each year (Table VII, page 15). Considering the fact that elections 
were held only in 1951 and 1956 this seems extremely high. 
Fifth Republic 
In (contrast: to the 21 Premiers during the 12 years of the Fourth 
Republic, there have been only one President and three Premiers during 
the 10 years of the Fifth Republic. Almost as striking is the degree 
of Cabinet stability (Table. IV, page 12 ) and the fact that there have 
been an average of S.3 Cabinet changes each year during the Fifth 
Republic as opposed to 14.0 changes during the Fourth Republic (Table 
VI). There has also been a rnarked increase in the stability of the 
National Assembly during· the Fifth Republic (Table V, page 13 ) , and an 
average annual change of only 67.6 compared to 158.2 during the Fourth 
Republic (Table VII). 
8 
It is clear that there has been a good deal more stability in 
French national governmental institutions during the present government 
than existed during the former. It can be argued that the results are 
stable in the sense that they are static. However, when political 
scientists speak of instability in France they refer to these condi-
tions. 
TABLE I 
PREMIERS DURING FOURTH REPUBLIC 
Premier 
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SOURCE: Beer, p. 412. 
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Premiers during provisional period. 
\0 
TABLE II 
___ CABINET COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR DURING FOURTH REPUBLIC 
Year PCF Sf IO PRRRS RGR UDSR ASR MRP -cNIP PRL RPF CNRS UNR UFF -other 
1947 5 9 .. 5 - - 5 5 ..; - - -- - -
1948 - 8 --- 4 - 1 - 10 1 - - - - .. - -
1949 - 5 3. - 1 - 5 1 1 - - - - ---
1950 - - 5 - 3. --- 2 - 6 - - - - - - 2 
1951 ... -__ 5· 5 .... 3 - 6 - - - - - - 3 
1952 - - 11 -- - 3 - 11 3 - - - - - 12 
1953 - - J:O - 2 .2 10 3 - - - - - - 10 
1954 - - 8 - 2 3 8 4 - - - - - 13 
1955 - - 8 -- - 3 1 2 2 - - 5 - -- 13 
1956 - 6 4 - 2 - - - - - - - - 1 
1957 - 7 3 - 2 - - - - - 1 - - -
1958 - 4 3 l 2 - 3 - - - 1 - - 3 

















NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR DURING FOURTH REPUBLIC 
RGR* UDSR MRP ** UFF Year PCF SFIO PRRRS ASR ·. CNIP PRL RPF CNRS UNR Other Total 
1947 182 102 ,.. 71 - - 166 29 38 - -· ... - - 35 618 
1948 186 103 - 70 - - 166 . :,29 38 .... - - - 36 618 
1949 182 104 - 70 - 10 155 30 34. - - - - 20 619 
1950 181 99 - 58 14. - 151 24. 30 ·.-22 - - - 42 621 
1951. 167 99 46 - 13 - 145 24 29 -- - - - 98 621 
1952 101 107 - 91 - - 97 98 -· 120 - - - 13 627 
1953 100 105 - 98 - - 88 134 - 84 - - - 18 627 
1954 100 105 - 101 - - E.88 136 - - 78 - - 19 627 
1955 98 105 - 100 - 33 85 104 - - 72 - - 30 627 
1956 150 94 .57 14 19 - 73 95 - - 21 - 52 52 627 
1957 150 100 60 14 20 - 74 99 -- - 22 - 42 15 596 
1958 148 101 57 35 - - 82 99 . - - 21 - 42 ' 11 596 
SOURCE: Ibid1... 
. . . 
*RGR was a loose coalition of PRRRS and UDSR. 
~ . . . . . . . . : . ' .. . . ) : ... : . . ;, ... ,·· . ·. -• 




CABINET COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH 
YEAR DURING FlFTH·REPUBLIC 
Year SFIO MRP UNR. . Non- Other 'l'otal 
Party 
1959 4 7 i2 3 26 
1960 3 :6 16 ·l 26 
1961 4 7 13 1 25 
1962 1 3 15 .6 25 
1963 1 3 14 8 26 
1964 1 3 13 8 25 
1965 1 3 13 8 25 
1966 1 3 ·. 14 7 25 
SOUR.CE: Political Handbook of the World, 1959-1966. 
TABLE V 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION .BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR DURING FIFTH REPUBLIC 
Year PCF SFIO PRRRS RGI{ MRP CNIP UNR UFF Non- Other 
Party 
1959 10 66 .· .. 16 .. · •. 66 57 136 189 - - 1 
1960 10 44 44 - 57 · .. · 119 210 45 - 24 · 
1961 10 ."58 ·. 37 · - 58 122 212 . 32 - -36 
1962 41 66·. ··. 39 - 55 36 223 - - 22 
.. 
.1963 40 68 39 · .. - 55 35 23-4 - - 13 
1964 40 68 39 •· ... 55 35 234 - - 13 
1965 41 68. . 39 - 55 35 231 - - 13 
1966 41 66 . 39 - 55 35 231 - - 15 
SOURCE: Ibid. 
:··~ ·~ 
* Not counting.temporaryAl~erian delegates. 
Total 












. PERSONNEL CHANGES lN CABINET COMPOSITION 
Fourth Republic . · Fifth Repubiic 
. Ye.ar Change Year Change 
1947 
1948 25 1959 
1949 10 1960 8 
1950 6 1961 5 
1951 4 1962 17 
1952 28 1963 4 
1953 7 1964 1 
1954 9 1965 0 
1955 20 1966 2 




Total 154 Total 37 
Average. :14.0 Averaije· 5 .3 
TABLE VII 
CHANGES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION 
Fourth R.epub U.c 







.1953 . . . :· 


























.· 1965 4 
1966 4 
Total 473 
Average f,7 .6 
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CHAPTER II 
. THE· POLITICAL BASE 
Political Culture 
Political Culture and Governmental Stability 
The first hypothesis of this paper is that.the individuals and 
groups that make up the French.political system adhere to basic patterns 
of beliefs which are likely to. result in governmental instability. +n 
simpler, and broader terms, this hypothesis could be restated in the 
following way: French political culture lends itself to instability. 
. . . . . 
The first task that-needs tobe accomplished in this chapter is the 
. . .· . 
definition and exploration of· ''basic patterns of belief s 11 or "political 
l, 
culture" a.nd their relationship to governmental stability. It is dif-
ficult to say just where the study of political culture started: some 
1 
would point to the ancient philosophers, others to Max Weber, still 
others to the work of Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils. 2 However, the 
first use of the term "political culture" seemed to be by Gabriel 
Almond in 1956. At that time he used the term to describe the notion 
1Max Weber, ~ Prot.estant Ethic ~- the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. 
Talcott Parsons (New York, 1958) and Max Weber,~ Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, tr. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947). 
2see for example Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward 
a General Theory· of Action (Cambridge, 1951). 
16 
17 
that, 11 ••• every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of 
orientation to political action. 113 To explain the importance and 
utility of the concept l'rofesi;or Almond stated: 
Political culture is not the same thing as general culture, 
although it is related to it. Because political orientation 
involves c~gnition; intellection,·and adaptation to external 
situations, as well a.s the standal'ds and values of the general 
culture, it is a differentiated part of the 'culture and has .a 
certain atitonomy.4 
Almond then went. on to brtef ly O:\ltline some of the differences in the 
political cultures of several political systems and to discuss the 
' ' 5 
importance of this type of study. 
In 1958 Samuel Beer discussed political culture in the following· 
words: 
In political science, a$ in any social science, we begin with 
individuals--actual men and women going about the business of 
politics •••• But for all their individuality, people also have 
much in cormnon. They share a cormnon human nature--certain 
emotional drives, intellectual capacities, and moral tenden-
cies. As we find it in any particular society, however, this 
cormnon human nature expresses itself in certain values, beliefs 
and emotional attitudes, which, with greater or lesser modi-
fication, are passed on by instruction or imitation from one 
generation to the next. These we call the culture of a 
society. 
Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are 
especially concerned with. how government ought to be conducted 
and what it should do. This sector of culture we call 
political culture.6 . . 
These statements explained the term political culture, a tei;m that 
has gained wide usage among political scientists. The term, in 
3Gabriel A. Almond, 11 Comparative Political Systems," Journal of 
Politics, XVUI (1956), p. 396. 
4Ibid. 
5 . Ibid~, p. :'397. 
6 ·' 
Beer, p. · 12. 
conceptual form, has been used in several studies, most motabfye in 
The Civic Culture7 and Political Culture and Political Development. 8 
18 
The next section of this paper is an analysis of the political culture 
of France, and a testing of the paper's first hypothesis. 
Political Culture in France 
Reformers and organisers, from within and without, 
neighbours and treaty negotiators, have again and again 
discovered, often with impatience, the existe.nce of a 
French personality which clings with the greatest cunning 
and tenacity to its habits, including its bad habits--and 
those who study the country more closely, whatever their 
angle or approach, find themselves continually, confronted 
with this personality.9 
The previous statement, by Herbert Luthy, was a typical statement of 
one studying the French political system. After reading such a passage 
the normal reaction is either tacit acceptance,or hostile rejection on 
the grounds that it is an indefensible generalization. Yet, in a 
thoughtful paper, neither of these two reactions is acceptable. The 
contention cannot be rejected, because it is too widely held, yet it 
cannot be accepted without further investigation. The first step is to 
pin down this "French personality," or at least pin down what people 
say about it. The second step is to investigate the reasons for the 
connnon acceptance of the concept 11 French personality, 11 and the third is 
is to measure the effects of that "personality," or the reasons for 
its acceptance, on the political system. 
7Almond and Verba. 
8Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political 
Development (Princeton, 1965). 
9 Herbert Luthy, France Against Herself (New York, 1955), p. 1. 
Perhaps the mos.t widely discussed element of the "French person-
.ality" is the high degree of individualism. P. E. Charvet described 
this individualism in the following way: 
If the idea of individualism anq its attendant quality 
of independance has been emphasized it is because this 
trait, more than any other, would appear to be fundamental, 
a thread running through the varied pattern: of French life 
and character. The corollary is that Frenchmen seemto 
have little so_cial sense.IO 
19 
An extremely widely read French political connnentator, Jacques Fauvet, 
carried this same thought a step farther. 
To.the Frenchman individual liberty means so much, his 
resistance to authority goes to .such lengths, that he is 
undisciplined. He shows this failing in everything that he 
does and, since political activity is more exposed to the 
public gaze, he shows it in this field more than any other. 
This individualism puts him ceaselessly iy1conflict with 
the government as with other authorities. 
Both of these writers claimed that the "average Frenchman" has such a 
high degree of devotion to the ideal of individualism that he is unable 
to accept authority. There is much evidence to back up their claims: 
French resistance to taxes; resistance to military service; disregard 
for police directives; the historical tendency for violent revolt; and 
others •. Andre Siegfried made the following comment. on this individual-
i~tic tendency in politics: 
It must be remembered that the. Frenchman, :the man on the street 
as well as the intellectual, is above all art individualist •••• 
This quality of mind, admirable in itself, becomes a serious 
liability in politics, since. it prevents ready adjustment by 
compromise. Every argument becomes a matter of principle; the 
practical results are relegated to second pla~e. 12 
10 · P. E. Charvet, France (New York,_1955), p. 15. 
11Jacques Fauvet, The Cockpit of France (London, 1960), p. 17. 
12Andre Siegfried, 1rstable Instability in France," Foreign 
Affairs, XXXIV ( 1956), p. 394. 
20 
This intense individualism and unwillingness to· compromise which seems 
to exist in France would be of the greatest importance in a discussion 
of political stability. 
Why do the French seem to be so individualistic and uncompromising? 
The answer to this question, if indeed there is a satisfactory answer, 
. . 
is very complex. One French political. scientist, Maurice Duverger, 
said this.: 
The variety o:f .races among the French will not astonish 
Americans; they are themselves familiar with great racial 
diversity. Compared with other European countries, however, 
France is somewhat e:xceptional in this respect. A com- · 
parison of France with Italy, Spain, the Scandinavian 
countries, Germany and Great Britain reveals a .notable 
difference .13 · .. 
Duverger went on to·explain the historical reasons for the lack of 
racial uriity iri France and the fact that racial differences follow 
regional lines. 14 This regionalism is reinforced by the strength, or 
weakness, of the Catholic Church, which varies greatly from one part of 
h 15 France to anot er. Differences in language, between North and South, 
East and West, Paris and the provinces, adds still more fuel to the 
intense differences between the different regions in France. 16 Each of 
these differences (racial, religious, and linguistic) presents diffi-
culties of its own. For example, the religious debate pr-events the 
cooperation of the Radicals and Socialists with the Christian 
13 Maurice Duverger, The French Political System, tr. Robert Ward 
(Chicago, 1958), pp. 3-4. 
14Ibid., p. 4. 
15 . 
See: Roy c. Macridis and Robert Ward, eds., Modern Political 
Systems: Europe (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), pp. 186-188. 
16 . · 
See P. E. Charvet, p. 24. 
21 
Democrats. 17 Thus, we see many small groups which prevent consensus. 
Even stronger reasons for the "French personality" can be found in 
French history. In that country's history, for several centuries, 
there have been two strong pe>litical traditions that are extreme op-
posites. Nicholas Wahl called them the "state-minded administrative 
pattern and the individual-oriented representative pattern, 1118 and 
said that they are, 11unintegrated and unreformed ••• competitive and 
19 
ho.stile." Many other Wl;'itel!'s have discussed this rivalry, which 
seems more bitter in France than in other European countries. Most of 
these writers have referred to the two t;-aditions as ''revolutionism 
d d · · · 1 · 20 d di d h 1 i f 1 · ' 1 an tra 1t1.ona ism, 11 aµ · scus1:1e · t e. resu ts n terms o po 1t1.ca 
instability. It should be pointed out that French political scientists 
.· 21 
have tended to agree with thi!,i analysis, find the split seems just as 
serious in this de.cade as ever before. Perhaps this split remains 
serious partly because of the country's basic value.system, which seems 
to be reflected in education and literature. Edwin Godfrey discussed 
the education system, and its stress, on theoretical political writers, 
22 fn his book on French government, and Raymond Aron further discussed 
17oavid Schoenbrun, As Fraqce Goes (New York, 1957), p. 76. 
18 
Wahl, P• 279. 
19Ibid. 
20 See for example: Saul K. Padover, French Institutions: Values 
and Politics. (Stanford, 1954), pp. 5-9. 
21see for example: Jean Chatelain, 1!, Nouvelle Constitution De La 
France (Paris, 1959), pp. 17-32. 
22Edwin D. Godfrey, The Government of France (New York, 1963), 
pp. 11-15. ~ 
"· 
22 
the importance of literature. 23 The effect of this educa,tion, and 
this related set of values, which stem from history, seems to be that 
11 the Frenchman thinks of himself as a humanist and this tends to affect 
his political thought. Re is likely to be uncompromising and ra,ther 
ineffective. 1124 It does indeed $eem that cultural sensitivity 11 domi-
nates their political actors.~ .and they do not accept the responsibi 1-
ities of democracy1125 as a result. 
One of the most important explanations of the IIFrench personality" 
is to be found in the country's socio-economic class system. Basically, 
France has many of the characteristics of an underdeveloped country and 
some of the characteristics of a developed. industrial state. As :. 
Francois Goguel has explaip.ed: 
In French political life the past has as great an influence, 
if not more influence, than the present •••• The France of 
earlier days, the France of small farms, small workshops, 
small busine.sses., the France of irtdividualism, the France 
where ••• politics is· a matter of taste ••• this France still 
survives today in many areas., •• Frap.ce has not been uniformly 
stagnant economicallyi, and some areas experienced an 
economic development similar to that·which other countries 
were tindergoiri.g.26 · 
This uneven development, which was called a combinatipn of feudal and 
industrial by Stanley Ho~~~nn, 27 haS resulted in a population that is 
23Raymond .Aron~ France: 
pp. 7-16 • 
Steadfast and Charigi~.&X Cambridge, 196.0), 
·· .. - ... 
24Pierre Barriere, La Vie Int;el lectue lle En France (Paris, 1961), - __,. 
PP• 1-39. 
25Jean Revel, The French, tr. Paula Sparlin (New York, 1966), 
PP• 1-30. 
26Francois Goguel, France Under the Fourth Republic (Ithaca, 1952), 
pp. 140-142. 
27 
Stanley Hoffmann, In Search of FJ;"ance (Cambridge, 1963), PP•· 3-8. 
severely split along socio-economic lines. 
Fr'ance . has: -two working classes: one is property owning and 
I integrated,' the other h propertyless and 'alienated.' 
France. has two farming classes: one owns its la11d, the other 
is composed of workers; tenants, and sp.arecroppers. France 
has tWO middle classes: one is 'JD.Odern, relatively prosperous, 
and •on the make, 1 the other is archaic, poor and on the 
decline.28 · 
23 
These socio-ec~nomic groups ·a:re well·?efined, · rigid and hostile towards 
. . 
each other. AsDavid Thomps~n said, the "peasants fear the political 
power of the workers ,1i 29 the 11 industriaJ workers resent the historical 
30 power of the peasants, 11 · the "middle classes are split according to 
degree of conservatism, 1131 and the upper class is split into ultra 
32 33 
'·'conservative gentry" and a less conservative 11 oligarchy11 that 
resents the gentry. 
These economic divisions are illustrated in Table VIII which in-
dicates the predominate ideological leanings of each major socio-
economic class. The peasants, who own extremely small family farms, 
are quite conservative because they look back to a time when the small 
land owner was self-supporting and more important politically. The 
non-landowning agricultural workers, who have much in comm.on with the 
peasants, tend to be radical or communistic because they want ownership. 
Industrial workers tend.to be communistic or socialistic, although 
28N.. . .. ·· 1·1·3··. oomm;. p •... · · •.. 
29navid Thompson, Democracy in France (London, 1964), p. 45 • 
. 30Ibid., PP• 50-52. 
31Ibid., P• 64. 
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there are some Catholic-moderates, and are generally quite violent. 
They cannot work with the peasants because of the historical conflict, 
and cannot work with the moderates be.cause of religious differences. 
The old middle class, shop owners and master artisans, are generally 
conservative because they oppose social reform, economic reform, taxa-
tion and seek to preseJ;"ve their historical importance as the middle 
class. The new middle 'class, 11white collar" salaried people, are much 
more progJ;"essive than the old middle class and a great deal of friction 
has developed between the two. The new middle c~ass is much less 
susceptable to the Church and this is another serious difference between 
the two. The upper class, which is marked by inherited wealth and 
whose members either live off rents or enter military or government 
service, is very conservative. There is some inter-class disagreement 
on how to prevent social change and economic redistribution but the 
ends are commonly agreed on. Needless to say, there is a great deal of 
animosity between the upper class and the new middle class, the working 
class and the agricultural working class. 
So, we find in France, a population that is severely split along 
racial, J;"eligious, regional, socio-economic, and philosophical lines. 
In.France there are two basic temperaments- ... Left and Right; 
there are three main tendencies, if the centre is included; 
six schools of thought; ten parties, large and small with 
numerous cross-currents; fourtee~ highly undisc:l.pli~e? 34 
parliamentary groups. and forty million different opim.ons. 
This evaluation of the p91itical base in France, a base that is highly 
fragmented and composed of alienated groups,. seems to be supported by 
both analysis and data research~ In 1957 Edgar Furniss ran a poll 
34 6 Fauvet, p. 2. 
26 
sampling French economic groups to .see if they felt "better off" than 
previously. Table IX shows the percentage responses. These figures 
suggest that French society, which is highly fragmented, is also quite 
dissatisfied. Much of this dissatisfaction appears to stem from the 
· belief of each group that other groups are relatively better off than 
. . . 
they should be and that the, politic:alsystem is not working properly.·. 
It is because of these antago~isms, and the fact that France remains a 
35 "less integrated" country than other European states, that the 
"French pe.rsonality11 persists. 
In practical political terms, 11 such a kaleidic economic and social 
pattern produced anumber of irreconciliable forces that, unable and 
unwilling to compromise, continued to prevent movement toward fewer and 
·. 36 ·. 
larger poHtical groupingf;l • 11 · 
No institutions have developed to bridge the gap between the 
individual and the state and make the first a full-fledged 
participant and the second an instrument for the realization 
of the demands and interests of the citizens. Voluntary 
associations, political parties, trade unions, and, in 
general, intermediary associations that allow for ~artici-
pation and provide for compromise, have been weak. 7 
So we seem to have an answer to the questions raised by the paper's 
first hypothesis and that hypothesis seems valid. The individuals and 
groups that make up the French political system adhere to basic patterns 
of beliefs which are likely to result in government instability because 
of the lack of consensus. It is clear that the basic conditions for 
instability exist in France, and have existed for some time. The 
35Phi lip Williams, Politics. in Post-War France (London, 1955), 
PP• 4-5. 
36 
Wahl, p. 355 .• 
37 · · .. 




Group Worse Off Same Better Off 
Peasants. 34 37 26 
Agricultural 
30 40 19 Workers· 
Industrial Workers 36 33 22 
Artisans 45 28 20 
Middle Class 36 25 29 
Professionals 38 28 25 
Retired 41 27 27 
SOURCE: Edgar S. Furniss, France-Troubled Ally, (New York, 1960) 
p. 147. 
question now becomes, why has the government of the Fifth Republic 




Perhaps a partial an.swer to this last question can be found in the 
ev~nts of the two time periods. Without question this is the most 
simplistic and least analytical part of the ariswer, but it cannot be 
overlooked. 
Fourth Republic 
In 1946 France had the political and economic scars of German 
occupation. Still, France was considered, foI'1tlally at least, as a 
great power and was called upon to act as one. The strains placed upon 
the French system of both an external and internal nature seem to have 
contributed to instability. A much greater burden was that of de-
colonialization. In the Middle-East·, in Indo-China and in North Africa 
the French withdrawal was costly and painful. The wars in Indo-China 
and Algeria not only placed huge d~mands upon the economy, but also 
caused deep political divisions. It seems reasonable to assume that 
these events, and their results, contributed to instability in the 
1946-1958 period. 
Fifth Republic 
The years since 1958 have been comparatively free from this type 
of severe political stress. The wars were over, or were ended, and 
29 
decoloniaUzation was virtuany completed. This one fact, that France 
was not engaged in war or decolonialization, must be remembered, al.;;. 




Constitutional Structure and Governmental Stability 
, The question. why constitutional structure is important is often 
1 
discussed in basic political science texts. These discussions usually 
center around the different forms that constitutions take and their 
functional role in. the politic·al system •. Form, which seerp.s .to. refle~t 
. . 2 
the social system .and the power structure within the system, is of 
less importance in this paper than function. This chapter deals with 
the second general hypothesis which suggests that the different degrees 
of governmental stability during the Fourth and ;Fifth Republics can be 
partially explained by changes that were made in the constitutional 
structure •. The analysis focuses on.the constitutional definition of 
3 
government organs and their powers, and relates thi.s definition to 
1For two examples see: Robert:Rienow, In'troduction to Government 
(New York, 1964), pp. 5-7; 38-45; 164-182; J. Roland Pennock and David 
G. Smith, Political Science (New York, 1964), pp. 239-261. 
· 2This belief is explained by many political scientists. One of 
them is Arnold J. Zurcher, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends 
Since World War II .(New York, 1955), pp. 1-12. 
3The importance of constitutional definition of structures is 
discussed by: Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and 
Democracy (Boston, 1950), pp. 173-236; Karl Loewenstein, 11 Reflections 
on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age," Constitutions 
and Constitutional Trends Since World War II ,ed.,,, At'nc,ld~·.J .·,~Zurcher, 




"The main objective of the framer of the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic was to correct the institutional defects of the past and to 
create a strong and stable executive. 114 The above statement was mqde 
in 1960 by Macridis and Brown and.was a fairly typical descriptive 
analysis of the de Gaulle Constitution. This chapter will therefore 
examine the Constitutions of the Fourth .and Fifth Republics to see 
whether that statement can be borne out. The Constitutions are compared 
at critical points to see whether changes were made that might help 
explain the different degrees of govermnental stability during the 
5 
two periods. 
Fourth Repub lie 
. On October 21, 1945 the Provisional .Govermnent held p·arliamentary 
c . 
~ lectlons 8nd subm~tt:~d to the elect orate the question of whether the 
Constitution of 1871 should be replaced •. · .. The results. were 18,500,000 
in favor of a new Constitution and 700~000 opposed (the results were 
remarkable for a French election). Those elected in the parliamentary 
elections formed the first national Constituent Assembly and started 
working on a. document. On April 19, 19.46 the Assembly adopted a Con-
stitution, but it was rejected in the national referendum of May 5, 
1946. On June 2, 1946 new parliamentary elections were held.and the 
4Macridis .;1nd Brown, P• 174. 
5 
For a discussion of the structure of the Fourth Republic Constitu-
tion I recommend Maurice Duverger, Constitutions Et Documents Politiques 
· (Paris, 1957). For a discussion of the Constitution of the Fifth · 
Republic see Jean Chatelain, ta Nouvelle Constitution et le Regime 
Politique de La France (Paris-;-1959). · ~ ~ 
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second national Constituent Assembly convened. It was obvious that the 
French wanted a new Constitution, but it was just as obvious that there 
was no agreement as to what it should contain. The second Assembly. 
adopted a new draft Constitution on September 28, 1946, and on 
October 27, 1946-the voters approved it by the narrow margin of 
9,200,000 to 8,200,000. This document was to serve as the legal 
foundation of the French Government for 12 years. 
During the 1945-1946 period the leftist parties, especially the 
Communists and Socialists, opposed the creat:i,on of an executive head 
of state. They were strongly in favor of assembly government and pro-
fessed both ideological .and practical fear of a President. Finally, 
after bitter debate, a President was included in the Constitution. 
Although the President was to be head of state, he was virtually power-
less in real terms. A quick reading of the 1946 Constitution might 
give the impression that the President held a considerable measure of 
power: Article 30 contained the power of appointment; Article 31 gave 
the power to ratify tre.aties; Article 32 m.ade 1:tim presiding officer of 
the Cabinet; Article 33 named him Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces; and Art:icles 3 4-35 contained certain judicial powers.. A 
closer reading of the document, however, reveals that these powers (and 
the office of :President) were designed to be symbolic and ceremonial. 
The President was elected by Parliament (Article 29) rather than the 
electorate and was thus prevented from ta~ing his case to the people.P 
Of even greater importance was the fact that the Pres:i,dent had no veto 
6Article 41 said that Parliament could, by a vote, determine that 
a President was incapable of performing .his duties and remove him. 
Although this did not constitute an impeachment process, it was used 
twice during the Third Republic to remove Presidents. · 
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power. He was required by Art~cle 36 to sign legislation within ten 
days (five days if so decreed by the National Assembly). He could send 
legislation back to the Parliament for "reconsideration," but the 
Premier could sign legislation into law if the President did not. It 
must also be noted that the President did not have the power of dis-
solution. 
These articles were a reflection of the desire to have a weak head 
of state (possibly because of the events in 1848 which had led to the 
establishment of a monarchy). They were also a reflection of the high-
ly fragmented party system and the lack of a majority in the Parliament. 
Both of the Presidents during the Fourth Republic were compromise 
select ions (Vincent Aurio.l was a minority socialist and Rene Coty was 
an independent) who did not have a power base with the electorate, with 
a strong political party, or with a coaiition in the National Assembly. 
As a result each of them operatep within the constitutional framework, 
and according to thewishes of the Assembly, as a figurehead, 
The real executive during the Fourth Republic, if there was an 
effective executive, was the Premier~ Articles 45-55 of the 1946 
Constitution discussed the Pr.emier and those articles were. more of a 
negative nature thari a positive one. They were more an attempt to 
limit the power of the Premier than to make him an effective executive. 
Article 45 insured that the Premier could not be appointed until he and 
his entire Cabinet .had been approved by an absolute majority of the 
deputies in the National Assembly. As the result, Premiers were forced 
to name Cabinets which reflected this support at the time and a great 
deal of Cabinet iminobility was the result. (Before 1954 the process of 
double investiture was followed: the Premier was approved and then the 
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Premier and his Cabinet ~re approved. This was changed in 1954 but 
did not attack the basic problems of multi-party instability and execu-
tive impotence). 
7 
Article 49 discussed the confidence vote and although an absolute 
majority was required for a vote of no confidence, government legisla-
tion could be defeated by a voting majority. In actual practice 
minorities were able to defeat legislation and compel Cabinet resigna-
tion. It was also quite clear that the Premier had to resign after loss 
of confidence and that interim power rested with the National Assembly. 
Article 51 described dissolution which was possible only if two 
previous governments had been toppled within an 18 month period. 8 This 
limited power of dissolution was in keeping with traditional French fear 
concerning anti-republican government. At the Constituent Assembly 
there were many who favored the British system of dissolution and 
argued that it would be aneffective means of insuring stability. 
However, they were overruled, and this rather weak dissolution power 
was given the Premier. 
It is obvious in reading the Articles (5-24) of the Constitution 
dealing with Parliament that the framers were not dedicated to the 
principle of separation of power but to that of legislative supremacy. 
As pointed out in Chapter I of this thesis, the National Assembly was 
severely fractionalized along par~y lines. This fractionalization made 
the legislative process extremely cumbersome and difficult. It was 
7A censure motion required only a majority of deputies voting. In 
1957 Premier Felix Gaillard proposed that this be changed to an absolute 
majority but he was ignored. 
8Again, in 1957 Gaillard attempted to give the Premier the power 
to dissolve Parliament.at any time but was defeated. 
difficult to pass legie;lation of any kind, and there were times when 
only the rather conservative, but solid, bureaucracy kept the country 
going. This inability to act was obv.ious many times, but at no time 
was innnobility more critical than in the Algerian Generals' Revolt in 
May, 1958, when the end finally came. 
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Election laws present another important item in the constitutional 
structure that should not be overlooked. The election law of 1946 
operated under the principle of proportional representation with party 
list voting. This system might have helped governmental stability had 
there been a nation-wide party of fair strength. However, there was· 
not a party strong enough,to benefit from the· system and as a result an 
alliance system of leftist parties supported the Cabinets of the period 
and kept them in office. In 1950-1951 it became obvious that these 
coalitions were in trouble and the left-center and center parties 
collaborated to pass a new elect ion law in 1951. That new law made it 
possible for a party to gain all of the seats in a district if it 
received a majority of the votes cast, The law aho made it posaible 
for several parties to combine their totals to achieve the majority 
and to thus exclude the opposition parties (this particularly hit the 
Cormnunist party and Rassemblement du Peuple Francais). This law helped 
to a degree, but did not solve the basic problem of a multi-party 
system. 
In summation, the Constitution of 1946 provided for a President 
who was little more than a figure head; a severely limited Premier; an 
undisciplined Parliament, and election laws that promoted parliamentary 
fractionalization. 
Fifth Re pub lie 
May 1958 saw France on the verge of civil war. The army in 
9 
Algeria set up a Committee of Public Safety on May 13, 1958, and 
36 
threatened to seize Paris H the National Assembly did not hand the 
Premiership to General Charles de Gaulle. 10 On May 15, 1958 de Gaulle 
stated privately that he would accept the Premiership and on May 19 he 
made the same statement before a formal news conference. On May 28, 
1958 the Pflimlin Cabinet resigned and on June 1, 1958 the National 
Assembly accorded de Gaulle confidence as Premier and gave him excep-
tional powers for six months. The p.ext day the Assembly voted to amend 
11 
the Constitution, and a committee started work on a draft. The final 
draft was accepted by de Gaulle ii;i early September and, on September 
28, 1958, passed in a national referendum by an 80 percent vote. 
During the months following de Gaulle's installation as Premier 
there was wide acceptance of the need. to vastly strengthen the execu-
tive. This was reflected in the draft Constitution. .General de Gaulle 
and his advisers thought that the problem of the chronic instability of 
the Cabinet and the impotence of the National Assembly could be cured 
by the creation of a strong executive. The office of President, which-. 
had been largely ceremonial during the Fourth Republic, was made 
. . . . 
extremely powerful. The President during the Fourth Republic was 
9 .Under the active leadership of a group of paratroop Colonels and 
the nominal leadership of General Salan. 
10 
These officers thought that a strong executive was necessary and 
that de Gaulle would support their position on 11 Algerie Francaise. 11 
11rt is not clear who worked out the draft Constitution, but it is 
generally accepted that de Gaulle played a dominant role. 
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elected by Parliament but, according to Article 6 of the new Constitu-
tion was to be elected by an electoral college (in 1962 de Gaulle 
submitted to referendum a constitutional amendment to provide for direct 
election of the President and it passed). In this way the President is 
no longer dependent upon the Parliament. Article 11 gives the Presi-
dent the power to submit legislation to the electorate in referendum 
and either bypass or overrule the Parliament. This seems to be a very 
powerful tool in the hands of a national executive, especially one a1; 
forceful as Charles de Gaulle. Perhaps the threat of referendum is 
even more useful than the referendum itself. During the Fourth Republic 
the power of dissolution rested with the Premier and was seriously 
limited. Article 12 of the 1958 Constitution gives the President power 
to dissolve Parliament at any time 11 after consultation with the Premier 
and the Presidents. of the Assemblies. 11 Needless tq say, "consultation" 
does not constitute a ch~ck or an effective l~gal restraint. Perhaps 
the most .striking article of the new Constitution is Article 16: 
When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of 
the nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment 
of its international conunitments are threatened in a grave 
and immediate manner and when the regular functioning of the 
constitutional authorities is interrupted, the President 
of the Republic shall take such measures conunanded by these 
circumstances, after official consultation with the Premier, 
the Presidents of the Assemblies and the Constitutional 
Council. 
Although this type of power was not new in France in an informal 
sense,it is significant to see that it was specifically included in 
the Constitution. This shows that de Gaulle considered it important 
enough in the scheme of executive powers to insist on it and that the 
electorate was willing to ac;:cept it, It should be obvious that the 
President himself defines a "grave and :i,.nmediate threat" and that 
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there is no constitutional check on his decision at that time. From 
a constitutional standpoint the President of the French Republic is 
probably one of the western world's strongest executives. 
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic does not contain a section 
dealing with the Premier, as did that of the Fourth Republic. Title 
III, which contains Articles 20-23, deals with the 11 Government 11 and 
Article 21 gives a bare o\,l.tlirie of the Premier and says simply that he 
shall direct operations of the Government, be responsible for national 
defense, insure the execution of the laws and have powers of an . . 
appointive and administrative nature. 
In absolute terms the Premier seem~ to have the same degree of 
power which he held during the Fourth Republic. The difference is in 
the relative sense--the powers of the President have been greatly ex-
panded and the Premier under de.Gaulle has been an administrative 
figure. 
Title V concerns relations between the Parliament and the Govern-
ment and insures Government supremacy. Article 38, for example, gives 
the Cabinet the power to pass binding ordinances. This power is 
limited by the fact that the ordinance must be submitted in the form of 
proposed legislation but it is binding in the interim. Conceivably, in 
times of parliamentary division, the Cabinet could govern by ordinance 
because of control of the legislative agenda and the threat of referen-
dum or dissolution. Article 41 gives the Government the power to veto 
legislation. If the Legislature objects, the Government can sustain 
the veto with the consent of the Constitutional Council (another 
innovation of _de Gaulle and whose membership favors the 
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Government).12 Article 44 gives the Government the power to prevent 
amendments from the floor and a great deal Qf power in controlling the 
legislative routine. It is obvious that the l,"elationship between the 
Government and the Parliament has changed drastically from the Fourth 
Republic to the Fifth and that the executive is no longer totally 
dependent on the National Assembly. 
The Election Law of 1958 divided France into single-member election 
districts with a second ballot necessary if no candidate receives a 
majority on the first ballot. This law obviously favors a nation-wide 
party headed by a popular candidate and probably has done much to pro-
vide France wHh the parliamentary majority which was lacking during 
the Fourth Republic~ 
During the Fourth Republ;i.c the President was a ceremonial figure 
chosen by the Parliament. He had no power base and was a compromise 
candidate who was relatively inoffensive. This was a reflection of old 
French fears of strong executives and 0£ the belief in parliamentary · · 
supremacy. The Premier was also dominated by the National Assembly and 
was made ineffective by the severe fragmentation of political parties 
and representation in the Assembly. The Premier's impotence was made 
worse by constitutional limitations on his power of dissolution and 
his relationship with the Assembly •. 
The President during the Fifth Republic is universally elected and 
is thus freed from the Parliament. His wide constitutional powers 
include a quasi-veto power, the referendum,the power of dissolution, 
12The Council consists of nine members plus all former Presidents. 
Three each are appointed by the President of the Republic, the President 
of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate. Most 
observers assume that de Gaulle has a safe majority on the Council. 
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and the power to rule by ordinance in "time of emergency." The 
Government (under th~ }?resident's direction) now controls the parliamen-
tary agenda, can pass binding ordinances and can lose confidence only 
by an absolute majority vote. It is·quite obvious that the Government 
now holds the. balance ofgovernmenial power in France. 
'· . . .. 
If any one change has.been the most important in bringing stability 
it is the change in election:laws. The adoption of the single.-member 
district system ha.s forced parties to choose between the two strongest 
candidates. In most cases the choice has been between a Gaullist and 
·. a far left candidat~ and the Gaullht party- has been able to enjoy 
a working majority in th~ National Assembly. 
These constitutional changes seem to have done a great deal in 
correcting the defects of multi-party parliamentary instability. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
Economic Production 
Economic Production and Governmental Stability 
The hypothesis that govermnental stability is directly related to 
economic production strength has been the object of considerable atten-
tion during the twentieth century. !ofax Weber believed that democracy 
. 1 
and stable govermnent could occur onlyunder industrial capitalism. 
Apparently, many economists ~md government leaders have accepted Weber I s 
opinion. More recently, Seymour Lipset discussed the concept _that 
stable democracie.s · could exis.t only in .econow.ically advanced areas. 2 
Although Lipset is somewhat inclined to ideology, his discussion of 
. 3 
stability and national wealth is interesting. 
This chapter takes a closer look at this hypothesis to see whether 
it presents any help in explaining why there has been: a greater degree 
of stability in France during the 1958-1968 period than in the 1946-
1958 period. If we find a marked increase in the wealth (productive 
capacity) in France, then we can prc:,ceed to explore the relationship. 
1 Max Weber, rrzur Lage .der Burge:i:-lichen Demokratie in Russland, 11 
quoted in Lipset, p. 46. 
2 
Lipset, PP• 45-75. 
3Ibid., PP• 51-54. 
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Economic strength is based on the gross national product (GNP) and we 
shall measure the differences between the GNP 1 s in the two periods. For 
better comparison, differences are adjusted for population increase. 
If any significant increase. is found we will investigate the effects 
on governmental stahi'lHy. (GNP figures are also adjusted for price 
changes). 
Fourth Re pub lie 
During the years of the Fourth Republic the GNP grew by an annual 
average of 4.93 percent (Table XIl, page 48). The population grew by an 
annual average of 0.8 percent ('l'able X, page 46 ) and the per capita 
GNP increased by 4.13 percent (Table XIV, page 50). It must be pointed 
put that the GNP in 1948 was fairly small, thus the ba~e for growth was 
good. However, the growth rate continued at a uniformly high rate. 
Fifth Republic 
During the Fifth Republic the GNP has shown an annual average 
increase of 4.4 percent (Table XIII, page 49). The average annual 
population increa.se has been 1.2 percent (Table XI, page 47) and the 
per capita average annual increase in GNP has been 3.2 percent (Table 
XIV). Thus we find that there was a decrease in GNP per capita growth 
rate between the two periods and that there has been no significant 
change in the economic production of .the country. The different degrees 
of governmental stability cannot be explained by an increase in eco-
nomic production and we must turn elsewhere for the answer. 
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Levels of Consumption 
Consumption and Govermnental Stability ,, 
The problem of measuring consumption is one that has long intel;'.-
4 
ested, and plagued, economists •. Consutllption is the question of factor 
5 
allocation and the most connnon determinant is income • Perhaps no 
. other factor is receiving more widespread government attention at the 
present time than is income distribution,6 and when national economies 
are compared, income distribution is always a prominent part of the 
. 7 comparison. The reasons for the study of income distri,bution are 
many, but the one that cqncerns us here is the long supposed direct 
relationship be.tween income equality and governmental stability. Robert 
Dahl and Charles Lindbloom discussed this relationship in Politics, 
Economics and Welfare in 1953 saying that "income inequality threatens 
' 8 
political stability," and that "This is one of the most· serious 
aspects of political instability in france and ltaly. 119 The problem in 
4Por examples see: Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic 
Analysis (New York, 1954), PP• 59-60, 1oe-12i, 123-194, 266-275, 
452-462, 588-687, 939.;.944, 1170-1184. 
5For a b~ief discussion see: Paul A, S$1Ilue lson, Economics (New 
York, 1961), PP• 111-129. 
6 
For a group of articles see: Wulfram D. Grampp artd Emanuel T. 
Weiler, eds., Economic Polic,Y (Homewood, 1961), PP•· t75-2.58. 
7For comparative examples see: George ·N. Halm, Economic Systems 
(New York, 1960), pp. 50-~3, 124, 203-206; William N. Laucks, Comeara-
tive Economic Systems (New York, 1961), pp. 57-60; James R. Eliot, 
Economic Systems~ Resource Allocation (Dubuque, 1963). 
8 Robert Dahl and Charles J.,indbloom,. Politics, Economics, ~ 
Welfare (New York, 195,3), p. 139. 
91bid. 
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Italy was discussed at some length by Clifford A. L. Rich in 1952 in 
10 · 
tb,e Journal of PoU.tics., and many WJ;"iters, commenting on France, have 
discussed inequality of income distribution and governµiental instability 
11 
as a cause ... effect relationship, 
This part of Chapte;r IV c;:ornpares the hi.crease in per capita GNP 
(increase in wealth) and compares i1;:tQ the increase in real wages 
(income), to arrive at the rate of change in income distribution. This 
rate is computed for the Fourth and Fifth Republics and the two are com-
pared. If there has been a E1ignificant ip.c;rease in inconi.e distribution 
during the Fifth Republic the relaticmship between distribution ·and 
stability will be explored further. 
Four,th Republic 
As shown in Table XIV, the real per capita increase in GNP during 
the Fourth Republic wa~ an annual aver,ge pf 4~13 percent. · During tb,e 
same time the real wage increa:;ed by an annual average of 3.52 percent 
(Table XV, page ·51). This means that the relationship between the two 
was (minus) -0.61 i>ercent;. In simple teJ;tns, the ~eai wage lagged 
behind the GNP and income dhtribt.1tion grew slightly .less equal. 
10 . 
Clifford A. L. Rich, "The Permanent Crisis of Italian Demc;icracy, 11 
Journal of Politics, XIV (1952), pp. 659-682. 
11 See: Dahl and Lindbloomp. 139; Schoenbrun, pp. 176-178, 180-
183; Luthy,.pp~ 178-179, 299~300, 313-314; Warran c. Baum, The French 
Economy~ the State.(Princeton, 1958); Pierre Bauchet, Ecoru;mic 
Plannina--The French Experien,ce (New York, 1964). 
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Fifth Republic 
The real per capita increase in GNP during the Fifth Republic was 
an annual average of 3.2 percent (Table XIV). During the sc;1me period 
the real wage increased by an annuai 1:tverage of 2.03 percent (Table 
XVI, page 52) for a (mirws) ... Q.99 percent relationship. This means that 
the reiationship between GNP and wages was actually more favorable 
during the fourth Re pub lie. In other words, it seellls that the degree 
of income equality did not increase dul;'ing the Fifth Republic and that 
this variable as such presents no explanation to the increase in 
governmental stability, 
In sunnnary, the third hypqthesis appears invalid. There may indeed 
be a direct relationship between economic production and consumption 
and goverrunental stability. However, in the case of the Fifth Republic, 
no increases in production or consumption were discovered 1:tnd therefore 
we must rule it out as a factor in explaining the increase in govern-
mental stability in France. 
TABJ..E X 











1956 43 ,843 ,000 
1957 44,311,000 
1958 44,789,000 
Average Increase; 0.8% 
SOURCE.: 
1966, p. 128. 
United. Nations .Pemographic Yea+book, 














1966 49, 440, 000 
Average Increase: 1.2% 
SOURCE: lb:i.d. 
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SOURC;E; United Nations World Economic Survey, 1949 ... 1958. 
·' 




PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GNP DU~ING YEARS OF FifTH REPUBLIC 










Average Change: 4. 4"/o 
SOURCE: . Un:(t'ed Natipns World Ectonomic Survey, 1958-1966. 
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T.A.BLE XIV 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN GNf ~INUS P~RCENTAGE INCREASE IN POPULATION 
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PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REAL WAGES DURING YEAR$ OF FOURTH REPUBLIC 














SOURCE: United Nations World Econornic Survey, 1949-1958. 































Social mobility, or the relative lack of mobility, has been a 
burning issue in this century, and al.most every politic~l commentator 
since Marx has discussed the issues related to mobility. Perhaps there 
is a built-in conflict between the need fqr an elite and the need for 
. 1 2 
mobility, perhaps techno,logy has increased the desire for mobility, 
3 
or mobility is a part of the modernization process. · Whatever the 
reasons, mobility has assumed a place of importance in the study <:>f 
political systems and their functioning and cannot be overlooked. 
This chapter takes up the fourth hypothesis concerning the rela-
tionship between social mobility and governmental stability. If the 
investigation of social mobility during the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
shows an increase in mobility, the relationship between that increase 
and the i~crease in governmental stability will be explored. 
One way of analyzing social ltlobility in a particular political· 
1 
Seymour Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, 11 A Theory of Social Mobility," 
Class, Status·and Power, Rei~ha~d Bendix and Seymour Lipset, eds., 
(New York, 1966), ·p. 570, 
2As popular acceptance of the "rising expectation" concept would 
suggest. 
3As implied by l.(arl Deutsch, 11 Social Mobilization and. Political 





system is by studying its educational process. The degree of educa-
5 
tion that an individual possesses is direc,tly related to status, and a 
system's pattern in providing education can be a useful tool in measur-
ing mobility. 6 Needless to say; this is not a definitive study of the 
French system of education. 7 It is rather an attempt to draw informa-
tion from the educational system that-will be-of some value in measuring 
the degree of change in social mobility between the 1946-1958 and 1958-
1968 periods. Table XVII, page .57 shows_ the number of students enrolled 
at each level during the years of the Fourth Re pub lie and Table XVIII, 
page 58 shows the same figures for the years of the Fifth Republic. 
The two tables show that there was fairly even growth in the 
number of elementary school students, somewhat more rapid growth in 
sec'ondary school students during the. Fifth Republic, and a great deal 
higher growth rate of university students during the Fifth Republic. 
Table XIX, page 59 gives the annual average percentage change in stu-
dents, adjusted for change in population, for each of the two periods. 
Universal elementary school attendance was achieved under the Third 
Republic, so the percentage increase during the Fifth Republic reflects 
4For an: i~teresting example see: Ralph H. Turner, 11Modes of Social 
Ascent Through Education," Class, Status, and Power. 
5seymour Lipset and Retnhard Bendi:>~, Social Mobility in Industrial 
Societies (Berkeley, 1959), pp. 35-36, 59-60. 
6 . 
For a discussion see: Bernard Barber, Social Stratification 
(New York, 1957), pp. 390-421. 
7 For discussions of the French educational system see: Beatrice 
Hyslup, France: ! Study of French Educa;tion (New York,.1964); Anthony 
Kerr, Schools of Europe (London, l960), pp. 143-156; Ertcyclapedie 
Prj\lti:qu,e de L I Education En France, Ministere de L I Education Nationa_le 
(Paris, 1960). 
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demographic increase. However, the annual average growth rate for 
secondary school students has more than doubled, while that .for college 
students has increased by 1000 percent •. These figures show that higher 
education has become possible for an ever increasing number of French-: 
men and that the increase seemed.too large to be considered a result of 
increased enrollment among the upper classes. This indicates a some-
what higher rate of mobility, but is not conc;.lusive evidence. 
The data contained in part two of Chapter IV indicates a lack of 
increase in income distribution,which would seem to indicate a lac;.k of 
social mobility. At this point we find that two important indicators 
of social mobility, change in income and education, seem to be in con-
flict. It is not possible to say that one is valid and the other is 
not, or that one is significAnt and the other is not. 
There are of course other fac;tors which can be used as indicators 
of social mobility. Class origin of government and party leaders is 
one of these factors. It is difficult to obtain data on this factor, 
8 
but what is available suggests no significant c;.hanges. · 
Perhaps another indication of this lack of increase in mobility is· 
the apparent lack of change in.the party platforms of the far left 
. . 9 
parties and their strength (this h especially true of the PCF). 
Other variables which seem to suggest a lack of mobility increase 
are the absence of change in persons per physician or inhabitants per 
8cabinet members and party leaders are listed in Political Hand-
book of the World and the backgrounds of the best known can be found in 
~o;-reference books. This method is by no means satisfactory but 
proper information could probably be obtained only in Paris. · 
9francais Fejto, The French Comnu.mist Party (Cambridge, 1967), 
p. 207. 
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dwelling room. 10 Other variable!;i which seem to suggest a slight 
increase in mobility, but which a;re difficult to quantify because of 
data shortage, are a decrease in the number of persons employed in 
agriculture and the increase in the number of persons in "white collar" 
. . 11 po1:11t1ons. 
The situatiQn was perhaps summed up by Laurence Wylie, who wrote 
12 
in 1963 that while there has been a blurring of class lines the clear 
division still exists13 and that these distinctions seem to be self 
14 
perpetuating. One gains the impression from. Mr. Wylie's analysis 
that social mobility apparently is increasing in france, yet in truth 
it is not. This seems to be the common opinion of students of Fren~h 
politics. This is, at best, confusing and academically frustrating. 
However, it seems that the fourth hypothesis can be neither proved 
nor disproved and there is no apparent answer without lengthy and 
expensive field study. It see'llls unlikely, however, that there has been 
an increase in the social mobility. rate. 
lOU ' d N i. S . ' . 1 Y, b k 1960 1966 . nite at ons tat1st1ca ear QO, - • 
11Economic Survey of Europe: 1961, p. 111. 
12 . 
Laurence Wylie, 11 Social Change at Gral;is Roots,.'! · In Search of 
France, ed., Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, 1963), p. 184. 
13Ibid., PP• 184-189. 
14Ibid., PP• 202-234. 
TABLE XVII 
NUMBER OF STUDENTS DURING YEARS OF FOURTH REPUBLIC 
Year Elementary Secondary University 




1948 4,478 891 147 
1949* 
1950 5,232 794 138 
1951 4,758 857 153 
1952* 
1953 ·4,658 948 146 
1954 4;921 1,001 . 150 
1955* 
1956 5,422 · 1, 157 160 
1957 5,579 1,266 176 
1958 5,351 1,335 186 
SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbook,.1948-1958. 
* Not available. 
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T.I\BLE XVIII 





































SOURCE: United Nations Stat;i.stical Yearbook, 1958-1966. 
* Not available. 
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TABLE XIX 
.ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN STUDENTS 
(ADJUSTED FOR CHANGE IN POPULATION) 
Eduq1tional · Level Fourth Republic Fifth Republic 
Elementary 1.53% -.55% 
Secondary 4.56% 10.72% 





After reviewing the politicaL life of the Fourth Republic it is 
quite obvious that a. high degree of .governmental instability existed. 
Between 1946 and 1958 there were 21 Premiers, an annual average of 14 
Cabinet changes, arid an annual average of 158 changes in the National 
Assembly. It is just as obvious that governmental instability has been 
much lower during the Fifth Republic. Between 1958 and 1968 there were 
only two Premiers, an annual average of five Cabinet changes, and an 
annual average of 67 changes in the National Assembly. 
The most basic explanation of the. pattern of instability is found 
in French political culture. The strong sense of individuality and the 
unwillingness to compromise found in the· 11 average Frenchman" seem 
related to the cultural heritage, educational values, regional differen-
ces, religious difference$ and wide differences in socio-economic group-
ings. The many economic classes (peasants, agricultural workers, 
workers, old midqle class, new middle class and upper class) are 
severely split and mutually antagonistic. These divisions have re-
sulted in a multi-party system of great instability. 
The different degrees of governmental stability during the two 
periods can be partially explained by changes in the constitutional 
structure. The electiori laws were changed to establish single-member 
districts with majority voting rather than proportional representation. 
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These changes have forced the voters in most districts to make a 
choice between the Gaullist candidate and his strongest opponent, often 
a Communist. In effect, the voters are falling back into one of the 
two main French ideological groupings: revolutionary or reactionary. 
This has helped bring about a bipolarization of de legates in the. 
National Assembly and has created a working majority in that body. The 
fact that there is now a nationally elected execut.ive also seems to 
promote the tendency towards political bipolarization and a stable 
parliamentary majority. Another area of change is that of Government-
Parliament relations. The Cabinet now has a great deal of power ip. 
the legislative process: regulating the agenda; prohibiting amendment 
or debate, passing binding ordinances, and legislating through delega-
tion. The Premier and his Cabinet are no longer pawns of the Assembly, 
but holders of governmental power. It should also be noted that a 
censure motion now requires an absolute majority and is much less likely 
than during the Fourth Republic (there has been only one censure motion 
adopted in the last ten years). Perhaps the most striking constitution-
al changes are related to the executive. The President is able to by-
pass. the Parliament through referendum, ask the Const;i..tutional Council 
to overrule Pat:liament, diss.olve Parliament more freely and govern J>y 
ordinance in exceptional circumstances. These changes seem to have 
played a great part in Fifth Republic stability. 
Another possible explanation of the increase in stability would be 
an increase in econotI1,ic prod1,1ction artd distribution. However, there 
has not been .an increased rate of growth in GNP or in real wages, and 
this variable must be ruled out. 
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Still another possible explanation for the increase in stability 
would be an increase in social mobility, but the data available is not 
conclusive. The increase in university enrollment, the increase in 
11white collar 11 positions, and the decl;'ease in agricultural employment 
seem to suggest such an increase in occupational mobility. However, 
the lack of increase in real wages and the lack of increase in consump .. 
tion suggest otherwise. · A lack of increase in social mobility is 
further indicated by the continued strength of the Communist party and 
the social unrest of 1966-1968. Although data cannot be obtained to 
either prove or disp;tove an increase in social mobility, such an in-
crease seems doubtful. 
The only substantive differences that c~n be found between the 
Fourth and Fifth Republic pe',J!."iods are those of a constitutional nature. 
It seems.that these changes, added to the popularity of Charles de 
Gaulle and the relief from external problems, explain the level: of 
stability of .the Government of the Fifth Republic. 
Those who contend that stability in France is the result of signi-
ficant economic or social changes seem to be in error and those who 
cite de Gaulle's charisma seem to overlook the political effects of the 
far reaching constitutional changes. Here, quite naturally, the ques-
tion of predictic;>n arises. After de Gaulle it is probable that the. two 
basic ideological groups into which the French nation has been divided 
for nearly two centuries, namely, a socially conservative bloc identi-
fied with authoritarian and paternalistic institutions and dedicated 
to the maximum retention of traditional values, and a reformist bloc 
espousing representative-parliament~ry institutions and advocating goals 
of social equality~ may spur the process of political bipolarization 
63 
into a two-party system. 
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APPENDIX A 
FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES 
PCF Parti Communiste Francais 
PSA Parti Socialiste Autonome 
PSU Parti Socialiste Unifie 
SFIO -- Section Francaise de 1 1 lnternationale Ouvriere 
PRRRS -- Parti Republicai~ Radical et Radical Socialiste 
RGR -- Rassemblement des Gauches Republicaines 
UDSR -- Union Democratic et Socialiste de la Resistance 
ASR Action Socialiste Revolutionnaire 
UGS Union de la Gauche Socialiste 
MRP Mouvement Republicain Populair~ 
CNIP -- Centre National des Independants et Paysans 
PRL Parti Republicain de la ~iberte 
RPF Rassemblement .du Peuple Francais 
CNRS -- Centre National des Republicainl:i Sociaux 
UNR ·- Union Pour la Nouvelle Republique 
UDCA. -- Union des Commercants et Artisans 
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